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DISSOLUTION AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGE UNDER
THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW ACT
In 1969 a revolutionary concept in divorce proceedings was introduced
into California law. The Family Law Act1 was the product of extensive in-
quiry into the public policy considerations and practical consequences of
prior divorce law, which had been predicated primarily upon concepts of fault.
As reported in the Assembly:
The bulk of our divorce law was established in 1872. The Plaintiff or cross-
complainant was required to submit evidence to establish that at least one of a num-
ber of grounds for divorce existed. The grounds were adultery, extreme cruelty,
willful desertion, willful neglect, habitual intemperance and conviction of a fel-
ony. Incurable insanity was later added.
Since it was necessary for one party to prove that such grounds existed, divorce
proceedings quickly became adversary in nature and that in turn added to the al-
ready extant divisiveness. Allegations of extreme mental or physical cruelty became
commonplace, and questionable methods of gathering effective but lurid and
ludicrous evidence were occasionally employed. As a result, bitterness was often
increased to the point that the division of property, child custody awards and
other matters incident to dissolution were not subject to resolution without se-
vere traumatic effects upon the children, as well as upon the parties.
Since the whole statutory scheme was unrealistic, a procedure evolved which
promoted hate, scorn, bitterness and acrimony. One party-usually the plaintiff-
wife-would appear at an often collusive default hearing. In response to a few
well-rehearsed questions of counsel that party would testify that "he made me
nervous," or "he would stay out late without explanations," etc.
A corroborating witness, made necessary by statute, would then take the stand
and "verify" the party's statements. The court would then grant a divorce.
It is not at all surprising that such sham procedures developed. It was a natural
reaction to the fact that proof of fault in a divorce proceeding is undesirable and
unrealistic ...
First in priority, then, in any divorce reform was the elimination of the artificial
fault standard. That is the premise of the Family Law Act. The intent has
been to devise practicable procedures and a basis for dissolution which is de-
scriptive of the actual reasons underlying marital breakdown.
2
The Act in its final form represented in large measure the work and rec-
ommendations of the Governor's Commission on the Family.3 Among
other charges, the Commission was to study the substantive laws of Califor-
nia relating to the family and suggest revision. However, the Act departed
significantly from the Commission's recommendation in one respect. In its
report the Commission observed that
1 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & West Supp. 1970-71).
2 4 CAL. ASSEM. JOUR. 8056-57 (1969) (emphasis added).
a Id. at 8054.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the essential question presented in the annulment of a voidable marriage does not
differ from that presented in any dissolution of marriage cases . . . [the Commis-
sion recommends] the elimination of the specific fault grounds, and the coales-
cence of all dissolution proceedings (save for declarations of nullity in case of void
marriages) into a single form of action governed by a single standard.
4
The legislature refused to follow this recommendation of the Commission
with respect to eliminating voidable marriage.
[The new law retains the action for a judgment of nullity based upon voidable mar-
riage (annulment) for the following reasons: (1) it is not certain that those fac-
tors which would constitute grounds for annulment under the old law-fraud in the
inducement, for example-would be determined by the courts to constitute either
irreconcilable differences or a breakdown of the marriage at the time a petition
for dissolution is filed; (2) for some persons the stigma of an annulment is less
offensive than that of a dissolved marriage; and (3) the annulment voids the
marital relationship ab initio.5
The Commission's proposed act 6 was also criticized respecting its disposi-
tion of contemporaneous voidable marriages:
[Ihf the Family Court Act is adopted, abolishing the action for annulment, no pres-
ently voidable marriage could be annulled (although, of course, such a marriage
could be dissolved, and a void marriage could still be declared a nullity). All
presently voidable marriages would thus be forever valid. Upon their dissolution
they would be treated the same as non-voidable marriages-that is, as formerly
existing, valid marriages. Parties to what are now voidable marriages would, there-
fore, be entitled to alimony, and the property acquired by their joint efforts will
be community or quasi-community property.
7
The validity of these and other objections will be discussed when appro-
priate to the ensuing examination of the present Family Law Act.
DISSOLUTION
The propriety of retaining an express statutory provision for void-
able marriage cannot be meaningfully resolved without a preliminary exami-
nation of the action for dissolution as presently constituted. The Act re-
pealed the prior statute which had stipulated fault grounds for divorce.8
The superseding statute is section 4506 of the California Civil Code, which
provides:9
A court may decree a dissolution of the marriage or legal separation on either of
the following grounds, which shall be pleaded generally:
4 REPORT OF THE GOvERNoR's COMMWSSION ON THE FAmILY at 35-36 (1966).
5 4 CAL. AssEm. JouR. 8060 (1969).
6 The Family Court Act, submitted to the California legislature as A.B. 230 &
S.B. 88, Reg. Sess. (1968).
7 Hammer, Divorce Reform in California: The Governor's Commission on the
Family and Beyond, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 32, 70-71 (1968).
8 The prior statute was CAL. Crv. CoDn § 92, (repealed by ch. 1608, § 3 [1969]
Cal. Stat.)
9 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
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(1) Irreconeiliable [sic] differences, which have caused the irremediable break-
down of the marriage.
(2) Incurable insanity.
In commenting upon this section, the Assembly stated:
Irreconcilable differences will be the basis of nearly all actions for dissolution. It
was chosen simply because it is in fact descriptive of the frame of mind of the
spouses in a marriage which is no longer viable.
Addition of the modifying phrase "which have caused the irremediable break-
down of the marriage" was not intended as the imposition of a second standard to
that of irreconcilable differences. It was only meant to describe the relevant
kinds of differences.' 0
Furthermore, the legislature was careful to define its use of the term "ir-
reconcilable differences" in section 4507 as
those grounds which are determined by the court to be substantial reasons for not
continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the marriage should be dis-
solved.1
Clearly, then, marriage was not to be terminable at will but at the discre-
tion of the court, thereby accomplishing the protection of society's interest in
the institution of marriage. Indeed, in determining the propriety of dissolu-
tion, the court could revert to fault considerations, subject to the above limi-
tation that they were "substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage."
The legislative pronouncement of policy in this regard, however, is found in
section 4509.
In any pleadings or proceedings for legal separation or dissolution of marriage
under this part. . . evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper and
inadmissible, except where child custody is in issue. . . or at the hearing where it
is determined by the court to be necessary to establish the existence of irrecon-
cilable differences.'
2
The import of section 4507 as applied in combination with section 4509 is
currently in doubt. If prior acts of misconduct were introduced in order to
establish irreconcilable differences, the philosophy of the Act might be frus-
trated. Insofar as such evidence may still be introduced, it must comply with
a higher standard of admissibility than under former law; not only must the
evidence relate to establishing only one criterion for dissolution (irrecon-
cilable differences), but such evidence is admissible only to the extent that it
is "necessary". It is submitted that the "necessary" standard is more rigorous
than the standard of relevancy which would otherwise apply.la One might
even suggest that the existence of a single alternative means of proving ir-
reconcilable differences would render evidence of misconduct unnecessary
within the meaning of the Act and the court would commit error in receiv-
ing it.'
4
10 4 CAr.. ASSEM. JoUR. 8057-58 (1969).
11 CAL. Crv. CODE § 4507 (West 1970).
12 Id. § 4509.
13 CAL. Evm. CODE § 350 (West 1968).
14 CAL. CIv. CODE § 4509 (West 1970).
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Under the .Act, the submission of evidence of misconduct in dissolution
proceedings (formerly divorce proceedings) has lost much of its appeal.
Prior to the Act, the courts of California had directly held that an equal divi-
sion of community property would be an abuse of discretion where one party
was guilty of heinous misconduct and the other party innocent.15 Accord-
ingly, it was in the pecuniary interest of the plaintiff in an action for divorce
to allege a grievous fault ground. This system of property division be-
came particularly unconscionable as the fault character of divorce became
more fictional.-" Thus, the fiction of off-setting cross-complaints evolved in
order that equal division of community property might be accomplished.
17
With certain innocuous exceptions, the Act removes the court's discretion
concerning property division. It provides in pertinent part:
the court shall. . . divide the community property and the quasi-community prop-
erty of the parties, including any such property from which a homestead has been
selected, equally.' 8
15 Arnold v. Arnold, 76 Cal. App. 2d 877, 883-85, 174 P.2d 674, 677-78 (1946).
16 4 CAL. ASSEM. JouR. 8056-57 (1969).
17 See, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
18 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1970-71). Exceptions to equal division
of community property are provided as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may divide the community
property and quasi-community property of the parties as follows:
(1) Where economic circumstances warrant, the court may award any asset
to one party on such conditions as it deems proper to effect a substantially equal
division of the property.
(2) As an additional award or offset against existing property, the court may
award, from a party's share, any sum it determines to have been deliberately mis-
appropriated by such party to the exclusion of the community property or quasi-
community property interest of the other party.
(3) If the net value of the community property and quasi-community prop-
erty is less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) and one party cannot be located
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the court may award all such prop-
erty to the other party on such conditions as it deems proper in its final judgment
decreeing the dissolution of the marriage or in its judgment decreeing the legal
separation of the parties. Id. § 4800(b).
The Act further provides that the court may order either party to pay all or a portion of
an obligation of a party directly to a creditor. Id. § 4358 (West Supp. 1970-71).
Subsection (b)(1) of section 4800 is clearly compatible with the no-fault equal divi-
sion premise of the Act. The subsection is designed to give the court discretion to ac-
complish an equitable division of property where necessity dictates an unequal distribu-
tion, for example where the primary community asset is a homestead and child cus-
tody was awarded to the dependent spouse. See 1 CAL. AssEm. JouR. 785-88 (1970).
Fault would not be a consideration. Moreover, the subsection would be available only
where "economic circumstances warrant". Accordingly, it appears to be innocuous as
an introduction of fault into property division. Subsection (b)(2) superficially appears
to be punitive in character, operating where a party deliberately misappropriates prop-
erty in order to frustrate equal division. Despite the culpability implicit in such con-
duct, it is suggested that the thrust of this provision is deterrence in order to facilitate
equal division. Subsection (b)(3) is designed to afford some solution to the practical
problem which arises where the sum of community property is small and one of the par-
ties is absent and cannot be located. See 4 CAL. AssEM. JOUR. 8457-58 (1970). With
respect to section 4358, the legislative intent is a matter for speculation. Presumably,
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Furthermore, spousal support (alimony),' 9 costs, 20 - and payments to credi-
tors21 are now functions of necessity rather than culpability. Additional
peculiarities of the dissolution proceeding, as established by the Act, will be
considered as necessary to the discussion of voidable marriage.
DECLARATION OF NULLITY
An examination of section 4425 of the Civil Code reveals that a marriage
is voidable and may be adjudged a nullity where certain conditions existed
at the time of contracting the marriage: (a) lack of capacity as defined by
section 4101, unless the party freely cohabited after majority, 22 (b) the
innocent bigamy situation commonly denominated "Enoch Arden",
23 (C)
where either party was of unsound mind, unless such party freely cohabited
after regaining reason, (d) consent obtained by fraud, unless such party co-
habited with the other after the fraud was known, (e) consent obtained
the section allows the court to accomplish an equitable result where there is substantial
indebtedness which, if equally divided, would overly burden a dependent spouse. The
court order is clearly discretionary and would appear to reflect necessity rather than
fault.
19 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1970-71).
20 Id. § 4370.
21 Id. § 4358.
22 See Id. § 4101. This section provides:
(a) Any unmarried male of the age of 21 years or upwards, or any unmarried
female of the age of 18 years or upwards, and not otherwise disqualified, is cap-
able of consenting to and consummating marriage.
(b) Any male under the age of 21 years and over the age of 18 years is capable
of consenting to and consummating marriage if such underage person obtains the
consent in writing of his parents, or of one of such parents, or of his guardian, or
an order of the superior court as provided for in Section 4102, and if such consent
or order is filed with the clerk issuing the marriage license as provided for in
Section 4201.
(c) Any person under the age of 18 years is capable of consenting to and con-
summating marriage if each of the following documents is filed with the clerk issu-
ing the marriage license as provided in Section 4201:
(1) The consent in writing of the parents of each person who is underage, or
of one such parents, or of his or her guardian.
(2) After such showing as the superior court may require, an order of such
court granting permission to such underage person to marry.
(d) As part of the order under subdivision (c), the court shall require the par-
ties to such prospective marriage of a person under the age of 18 years to participate
in premarital counseling concerning social, economic, and personal responsibilities
incident to marriage, if it deems such counseling necessary. Such parties shall not
be required, without their consent, to confer with counselors provided by religious
organizations of any denomination. In determining whether to order the parties
to participate in such premarital counseling, the court shall consider, among other
factors, the ability of the parties to pay for such counseling.
23 California's Enoch Arden statute is typical, providing that a marriage is void-
able, not void, notwithstanding that the first spouse was living at the time of contracting
the second marriage, where
the former husband or wife is absent and not known to such person to be living
for the space of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent mar-
riage, or is generally reputed or believed by such person to be dead at the time
such subsequent marriage was contracted. . . . CAL. Civ. CODE § 4401(2) (West
1970).
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by force, unless such party afterwards freely cohabited with the other, or
(f) apparently incurable physical incapacity to enter into the marital state.2 4
As previously observed, the legislature retained these grounds for several
reasons, including its view that less opprobrium was associated with null
marriages than broken marriages. One might observe, however, that the Act
manifests a significant change in public attitude concerning divorce. It is
true that dissolution is not available at will and is still subject to judicial re-
view and discretion. However, a fair inference might be that, in removing
the onus of fault from dissolution, the legislature has recognized a pre-
vailing state of mind in our society: marriage may prove impracticable
without culpability. This is not to say that an impression of personal failure
has been eliminated. Since evidence of prior misconduct would normally be
improper, neither party has been able to vindicate himself by showing that
irreconcilable differences occurred notwithstanding his ability to enter into
and sustain a viable human relationship. An aftertaste of failure may linger,
deterring and obstructing future relationships. The grounds of section 4425,
coupled with the ab initio aspect of declaration of nullity would remove this
shadow and leave no aftertaste of failure as to the putative spouse. The
world would be on notice that, through no fault of the putative spouse,
the purported status never existed.25 Furthermore, a pronouncement that
no marriage existed might accord more favorably with the religious views
of some parties, facilitating subsequent entry into a valid marriage.
Should an action for declaration of nullity under 4425 be brought by a
non-putative spouse, little property advantage could be obtained. While a
putative spouse would enjoy what appears to be a right in "quasi-marital
property" 26 substantially the same as in community and quasi-community
property, the section 4425 action would not be desirable for a non-puta-
tive spouse. Although a culpable spouse could participate in division of
community property upon dissolution,2 7 a non-putative spouse might be pre-
24 Id. § 4425.
25 The Act defines a putative spouse as one who "believed in good faith that the
marriage was valid." CAL. Civ. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1970-71). To this extent
the Act reaffirms the essential aspect of the remedy made available to a putative
spouse under prior law. See, e.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761
(1943).
Where the Act does not depart significantly from former statutory language reference
can be confidently made to prior case law in order to anticipate prospective judicial
construction. Decisions subsequent to the Act uniformly demonstrate that the courts
will analogize statutory language in the Act to similar wording under prior statutes, con-
struing the provisions according to prior case law. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Ruiz, 6 Cal. App.
3d 58, 85 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1970); Estate of LaMont, 7 Cal. App. 3d 437, 86 Cal. Rptr.
810 (1970).
28 Quasi-marital property is defined as "that property acquired during the union
which would have been community property or quasi-community property if the union
had not been void or voidable." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1970-71).
27 See discussion note 18 supra.
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cluded from participation in quasi-marital property. For example, where
the property acquired during the voidable marriage was the product of the ef-
forts of the putative spouse, the non-putative spouse will probably be pre-
cluded from asserting a quasi-marital interest.28 Of course, if the petitioner
were putative and respondent were non-putative, an advantage might accrue
under the provisions for declaration of nullity. The putative spouse could
enjoy a substantially larger participation in the property accumulated dur-
ing coverture by virtue of the exclusion of the non-putative spouse.
Under appropriate facts, a putative spouse might thus benefit from the
nullity remedies. Such a situation could arise where a non-putative spouse
was attempting to secure dissolution and participation in community prop-
erty. Where a mandatory interlocutory period or jurisdiction was not at is-
sue, any other combination of parties would be inclined to bring the action
for declaration of nullity exclusively for philosophical reasons.29
In order to determine if the section 4425 grounds could properly be in-
cluded within irreconcilable differences, it is appropriate to consider each
separately. Subsection (a) provides for declaration of nullity where:
The party who commences the proceeding or on whose behalf the proceeding is
commenced was without the capability of consenting thereto as provided in Section
4101, unless, after attaining the age of consent, such party for any time freely co-
habited with the other as husband and wife. 30
Section 4101, in turn, provides that males who are at least 21 and fe-
males who are at least 18 may consent to marriage.3 1 Parties who fail
to qualify under this provision must comply with certain requirements, for
example consent of a parent or guardian, before entering into a valid mar-
riage.32 If a purported marriage is contracted without strict compliance with
the terms of section 4101, the marriage is within the purview of subsection
(a), and voidable. If, on the other hand, parties who lack section 4101
capacity go to another state and enter a marriage valid where contracted,
the marriage will not be voidable in California.33  This would appear to be
true even where the parties leave the state for the express purpose of avoid-
28 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1970-71). See also page 352 infra.
29 One might argue that such parties would seek an action for declaration of
nullity because such a judgment would operate ab initio, relating back to the time of
contracting the purported marriage, whereas dissolution would not. However, since
considerations of equity and fairness have determined the extent to which the doctrine of
relation back will be indulged where strangers to the action are involved, the textual
statement is thought to be fair.
30 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4425(a) (West 1970). For the provisions of § 4101, see
note 22 supra.
81 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4101(a) (West Supp. 1970-71).
32 Id. § 4101(b), (c). Seenote 22supra.
33 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4104 (West 1970). See 4 J. GODDARD, CALinoRlui PRACrICE
§ 530 (1965 & Supp. 1970).
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ing California law.34 This would indicate that subsection (a) does not artic-
ulate a fundamental state public policy against under-age marriages, not-
withstanding the fact that they are voidable under the Act. A recent case de-
cided in the First Appellate District would suggest otherwise. In Ruiz v.
Ruiz35 the court stated that "it seems clear that the code declares an af-
firmative policy of the state to restrict marriages of minors ... ."3 Ac-
cordingly, the court reasoned that it would frustrate this policy to allow a
respondent to invoke the affirmative defense of unclean hands to petitioner's
action to annul under subsection (a). "[T]o permit a minor to effect a
valid marriage by his own knowing misrepresentation is to allow him to de-
feat the very purpose of the statute."8 7  One might observe, however, that
to permit a minor to secure a valid marriage by merely leaving the jurisdic-
tion of the state is also to frustrate the "very purpose of the statute" as
viewed by the Ruiz court.3 8 Hence, the reasoning of the court in Ruiz
does not compel a conclusion that subsection (a) is expressive of strong
public policy in this state that marriages contracted by minors are onerous.
Rather, it is submitted that subsection (a) is prophylactic, designed to pro-
tect minors from their own improvidence. As a practical matter elimination
of subsection (a) as a basis for voidable marriage would either render such
marriages initiated in California void (in the sense of no marriage),30 or
valid for all purposes against the world. The former alternative would
clearly be undesirable. The rights of minor parties to a good-faith "non-
marriage" would be unclear. 40  There would not appear to be a strong pub-
34 McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P.2d 163 (1936). See 4 J. GODDARD,
supra note 33, at § 531.
35 6 Cal. App. 3d 58, 85 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1970).
36 Id. at 60, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
37 Id.
38 See McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P.2d 163 (1936).
39 There is no provision in California law for "common law" marriages. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1970).
40 "Non-marriage", as used herein, denotes a good faith relationship other than a
valid, voidable, or void marriage, each of which are specifically defined under the Act.
See CAL. CIV. CODE 99 4100, 4400, 4401, 4425 (West 1970), § 4101 (West Supp. 1970-
71). The Act limits the judicial recognition of quasi-marital property to void or void-
able marriages involving at least one putative spouse. Id. § 4452. Suppose that minors,
not complying with the competency or consent requirements of section 4101, attempt in
good faith to marry. If section 4425(a) were repealed (and the marriage were therefore
not considered voidable) it would either be valid for all purposes (an unlikely result
since common law marriage is not recognized in California) or it would be a "non-mar-
riage". An action for declaration of nullity would not be available to the parties because
the marriage would not be "void" or "voidable". Hence, the recognition of quasi-marital
property would appear to be inappropriate. Note that case law prior to the Act suggests
that parties to non-marriages could be treated in equity as putative. See Sancha v. Ar-
nold, 114 Cal. App. 2d 772, 251 P.2d 67 (1952); Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App. 2d 62,
89 P.2d 164 (1939). However the availability of this equitable remedy is in doubt be-
cause of the restricted statutory definition of "putative". CAL. Civ. CODE § 4452 (West
Supp. 1970-71).
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lic policy against the marriage per se, as disclosed previously. Conversely,
if such marriages were considered valid for all purposes, minors would be
denied the protection of their parents and guardians. The only remedy
available under the Act would be dissolution. 41 Apparently only parties to
the marriage could bring the action, 42 but such parties, by hypothesis, would
lack the judgment to conceive their best interests. It would appear, there-
fore, that subsection (a) serves a valid and useful purpose in protecting the
interests of minors and parents. The fact that it might be easily circum-
vented by contracting the marriage in another state does not compel ' con-
clusion that it is disfunctional. When minors do not leave this state they
should have recourse to declarations of nullity. Furthermore, where very
young minors are involved, a marriage would be at least voidable in every
state. California should afford minors similar protection and a forum in
which to seek a remedy.
Declaration of nullity is available under subsection (b) of section 4425
when:
The husband or wife of either party was living and the marriage with such hus-
band or wife was then in force, provided, however, that such husband or wife was
absent and not known to the party commencing the proceeding to be living for a
period of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent marriage for
which the judgment of nullity is sought, or was generally reputed or believed by
such party to be dead at the time such subsequent marriage was contracted. 43
Note that the section provides a remedy only where the party seeking relief
is putative. Furthermore, the relief is available under those circumstances
where the first husband or wife was merely absent for the statutory period
and not affirmatively known to the petitioner to be living, or where the peti-
tioner believed him to be dead at the time of contracting the voidable
marriage.
44
It would be specious to suggest that inclusion within the dissolution rem-
41 CAL. Crv. CODE § 4350 (West Supp. 1970-71).
42 See Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 166 P.2d 622 (1946) (guardian
lacks standing to bring action for divorce on behalf of an incompetent ward because of
personal nature of the suit).
43 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4425(b) (West 1970).
44 The import of the phrase "or was generally reputed" is dubious. As a matter of
statutory construction, if the phrase modifies "or believed", one might argue that the be-
lief of the party seeking relief must be predicated upon a general reputation. If, how-
ever, the clause were to stand alone, one might suggest that general reputation might be
sufficient, irrespective of the spouses' credulity. At least one California Supreme Court
case decided prior to the Act indicated the former construction. Cf. Estate of Har-
rington, 140 Cal. 244, 247, 73 P. 1000, 1001 (1903) (dictum) (the statutory rule con-
strued as "generally reputed and believed"). No cases have been found where annulment
was granted on the basis of general reputation without belief of the death of the prior
spouse where relief was sought under this clause. Obviously, requiring subjective be-
lief is consonant with the public policy against knowingly entering into bigamous mar-
riage.
1971]
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edy as it now exists would afford an adequate -remedy under the facts
contemplated by subsection (b). True, the belated appearance of a prior
spouse might afford a substantial reason for not continuing the second
marriage. 45 However, from the point of view of the remarried spouse,
dissolution would be an undesirable remedy. Entry of final judgment
for dissolution presupposes the issuance of an interlocutory judgment
and the expiration of at least six months.46  The declaration of nullity,
however, operates instantaneously and relates back. Accordingly the
obstacle of the second voidable marriage is removed without delay.
47
The status of the prior marriage would otherwise be in doubt during
this period. There would appear to exist a logical inconsistency be-
tween granting an interlocutory judgment of dissolution (which presupposes a
prior valid marriage) and a simultaneous valid other marriage. It would be
little encouragement to either party to the first marriage to suggest another
marriage after the expiration of the interlocutory period and dissolution of
the second marriage in order that their legal status might be crystallized.
Furthermore, remarriage before the expiration of the interlocutory period
would be void ab initio unless the court fictionalized some status during this
period.4
8
The express legislative pronouncement that the facts of subsection (b)
of section 4425 give rise to voidable marriage has another consequence.
Note that subsection (b) is a conspicuous legislative exception to the general
rule that an attempt at remarriage while one's spouse is alive is void (not
voidable) as inimical to public policy.49 Thus deletion of subsection (b)
would appear to render the good faith second marriage void.50
Subsection (c) of section 4425 provides for declaration of nullity if:
Either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.51
Here, it is appropriate to note that dissolution is available on two bases, ir-
reconcilable differences and incurable insanity. 52 The required showing for
45 Note that the prior spouse would lose standing to vitiate a subsequent viable rela-
tionship against the will of the remarried spouse. For a more complete examination of
this consequence see the discussion at p. 347 infra.
46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4514 (West 1970).
47 Id. § 4429. See Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955). Cf.
CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 4512, 4515 (West 1970).
48 A judgment nunc pro tunc would be unavailable prior to the expiration of the in-
terlocutory period. Moreover, such a judgment could not validate a marriage con-
tracted during the interlocutory period since it relates back only to the time that a final
judgment could have been entered. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4513, 4514 (West 1970).
49 Id. § 4401.
50 There is case authority for the proposition that where no voidable marriage ex-
ception is expressly provided by the legislature, all bigamous marriages are void. Town-
send v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 63 A.2d 743 (1949).
51 CAL. CiV. CODE § 4425(c) (West 1970).
52 Id. § 4506.
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dissolution of marriage on the ground of incurable insanity is set forth in con-
siderable detail in section 4510. 53 Even a cursory reading of the section is
sufficient to compel a conclusion that 4425(c) is incompatible. Section
4510 provides that dissolution on the basis of incurable insanity will be
granted only upon proof that the insane spouse is incurably insane at the time
of the proceeding. No other time is specified. Section 4425, however,
requires that the person be of unsound mind at the time of contracting the
marriage. Section 4425 expressly provides that the mental condition need
not be incurable, nor need it last until the proceeding for declaration of nul-
lity. Moreover, under 4426(c), 54 the action can only be initiated by the
"party injured" or the relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind.
Presumably, if the marriage was initiated with knowledge of the mental
condition, the other spouse would have consented to the condition or waived
his rights with respect thereto. He would therefore not be a party injured
within the meaning of the statute. No similar restriction on the party who
may bring the action is found in section 4510. Furthermore, no provision
is included in section 4510, as it is in nullity proceedings, granting rela-
tives or guardians standing to bring an action for dissolution. Prior case
law suggests that without an express provision such standing will not be
recognized.55  Accordingly, persons of unsound mind entering into mar-
riages would be denied the protection of relatives and guardians if 4425(c)
were deleted in favor of the dissolution remedy. An unscrupulous person
could exploit the mental inadequacy of the innocent spouse so long as the
mentally deficient spouse was content to continue in the relationship. By
hypothesis, such an innocent spouse would be incompetent to formulate a
reasoned judgment and protect his own best interests.
53 A marriage may be dissolved on the grounds of incurable insanity only upon
proof, including competent medical or psychiatric testimony, that the insane
spouse was at the time the petition was filed, and remains, incurably insane.
No decree granted on this ground shall relieve a spouse from any obligation im-
posed by law as a result of the marriage for the support of the spouse who is incur-
ably insane, and the court may make such order for support, or require a bond
therefor, as the circumstances require.
If the insane spouse has a general guardian or guardian of his person, other than
the spouse bringing the action, the petition and summons shall be served upon the
insane spouse and such guardian and he shall defend and protect the interests of
the insane spouse. If the insane spouse has no general guardian or no guardian of
his person, or if the spouse bringing the action is the general guardian or guardian
of his person, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem, who may be the district
attorney or the county counsel, if any, to defend and protect the interests of the in-
sane spouse. If a district attorney or county counsel is appointed guardian ad litem
pursuant to this paragraph, his successor in the office of district attorney or county
counsel, as the case may be, succeeds him as guardian ad litem, without further ac-
tion by the court or parties. Id. § 4510.
54 A proceeding to obtain judgment of nullity of marriage, for causes set forth in
Section 4425, must be commenced within the periods and by the parties, as follows:
(c) For causes mentioned in subdivision (c): by the party injured, or relative
or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either
party. Id. § 4426.
55 See Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 166 P.2d 622 (1946).
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Subsection (d) of section 4425 states that a declaration of nullity may is-
sue when:
The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party after-
wards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife.56
Recall that in justifying the retention of voidable marriage the legislature ex-
pressly observed that consent procurred by fraud might not be considered
within the meaning of irreconcilable differences. 57 It is submitted that in
practice the likelihood of such a judicial construction would be remote. At
the outset, it is to be observed that under either the voidable marriage or
dissolution approach a de facto marriage would exist until one of the parties
decided to terminate it.58 Presumably, if the fraud were not considered
a substantial reason for discontinuing the relationship neither action would
be initiated by reason of it. It would be frivolous to suggest that the four-
year limitation upon the action for declaration of nullity59 would sustain the
marriage in spite of the fraud. If the party refused to continue to cohabit
with his spouse because of a prior fraud, a substantial reason for discon-
tinuing the marriage would exist and dissolution would be appropriate. The
availability of dissolution is even more probable since prior case law sug-
gests that the marriage will be annulled on the basis of fraud only where
that fraud goes to "the essentials of the marriage relation."6 0
Practical considerations afford a more realistic reason for retaining the
fraud grounds of voidable marriage distinct from dissolution. Whereas sec-
tion 4426(d) purports to limit the action for nullity based on fraud to the
party injured,61 the dissolution provisions make no reference to fault and
therefore are not so limited.62  As previously observed, the perpetrator of
the fraud could probably maintain an action in dissolution irrespective of
6 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425(d) (West 1970).
57 See discussion p. 332 supra.
58 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4350 (West Supp. 1970-71).
59 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4426(d) (West 1970).
60 Annulment granted onx basis of fraud: Hardesty v. Hardesty, 193 Cal. 330, 223
P. 951 (1924) (concealment of pregnancy by another); Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797,
167 P. 394 (1917) (secret determination not to engage in matrimonial intercourse);
Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d 636, 334 P.2d 1011 (1959) (fraudulent procurement
of parental consent); Douglass v. Douglass, 148 Cal. App. 2d 867, 307 P.2d 674 (1957)
(concealment of odious criminal record); Schaub v. Schaub, 71 Cal. App. 2d 467, 162
P.2d 966 (1945) (secret intention to continue in illicit relation); Vileta v. Vileta, 53
Cal. App. 2d 794, 128 P.2d 376 (1942) (concealment of sterility). Annulment de-
clined on basis of fraud: Marshall v. Marshall, 212 Cal. 736, 300 P. 816 (1931) (mis-
representation of financial position); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 171 Cal. 770, 155 P. 95 (1916)
(misrepresentation of prior chaste character). See generally 4 J. GODDARD, supra note
33, at § 564 (1965, Supp. 1970); 1 B. ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 65-75
(1953).
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4426(d) (West 1970).
62 Id. § 4506-4510.
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the provisions of 4426(d).6 3  Accordingly, an unconscionable result might
follow in that he could potentially profit from his own wrong. 64 Further-
more, if 4425(d) were repealed, the innocent putative spouse would suffer
the additional hardship of a compulsory interlocutory period.6 5 As long
as the remedies pursuant to 4425(d) are available, the putatitve spouse
upon discovery of the fraud could instantaneously sever the relationship and
be available for subsequent marriage. Requiring an interlocutory period for
the purpose of facilitating reconciliation in marriage would be a futile for-
mality since the fraudulently procured marriage never existed as contemplated
by the putative spouse. The limitations of 4426(d) would also preclude a
non-putative spouse (one with knowledge of the fraud), or the spouse who
had continued to cohabit for the statutory period after disclosure, from tak-
ing advantage of the instantaneous aspects of declaration of nullity. Where
the defrauded party has failed to seek judicial redress more than four years
after discovery of the fraud, it is reasonable to assume that the fraud alone
did not afford a substantial reason for discontinuing the marriage. The
likelihood of a sham nullity proceeding is thus reduced. This result is com-
patible with the legislative purpose which the Act reflects, which is that mar-
riage will be terminated on a basis descriptive of the actual reasons underly-
ing marital breakdown. 6
Similar objections could be raised to elimination of subsection (e) of sec-
tion 4425 which applies where:
The consent of either party was obtained by force, unless such party afterwards
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.67
Similarly to marriage procured by fraud, no viable marriage would exist
in fact so long as the debilitory effect of the force remained. As with fraud,
the culpable party would not have the nullity remedy available to him. The
declaration of nullity would provide an immediate remedy to the innocent
spouse, freeing her for subsequent marriage. Moreover, she would not be
vulnerable to the potential opprobrium associated by many with divorce.
Subsection (f) provides for declaration of nullity where:
Either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into
the marriage state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.6 8
63 Cf. Chaffee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REv. 1065,
1083-84 (1949); Ruiz v. Ruiz, 6 Cal. App. 3d 58, 85 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1970).
64 The non-putative spouse might well bring an action for dissolution in order to
enjoy an equal participation in community property, thereby securing an interest in
property which might have been accumulated solely through the efforts of the innocent
putative spouse. If section 4425(d) was unavailable, the putative spouse could not
cross-petition for declaration of nullity in order to protect his interest. Recall that un-
der these circumstances, it is likely that quasi-marital property would not be recognized
in the non-putative spouse. See p. 336 supra.
65 CAL. Crv. CODE § 4512-14 (West 1970).
66 4 CAL. AssEM. JouR. 8053, 8057 (1969).
67 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425(e) (West 1970).
68 Id. § 4425(f).
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One might assume that incurable physical incapacity, sufficient by defi-
nition to preclude entering into the marital status, would constitute a sub-
stantial reason for not continuing the marriage, and therefore justify a finding
of irreconcilable differences. Of course, all such speculation is subject to the
limits imposed by the proper exercise of the court's discretion. 69 It also
presupposes inquiry by the court into the factual basis of the assertion of ir-
reconcilable differences. Conceivably, both parties could be putative spouses
in an action for declaration of nullity on the basis of incurable physical in-
capacity as contemplated by subsection (f). In such a situation, the fault
implications of the fraud and force grounds for annulment would be absent.
The property division would be identical to that pursuant to dissolution. °
The unfortunate parties would be free of the six-month delay required by the
interlocutory judgment of dissolution and would be immediately free for
another union. It is submitted, however, that if the interlocutory period
serves a useful purpose as applied to dissolution, it could be profitably added
to the present provisions for declaration of nullity on the basis of incurable
physical incapacity. For both parties to be putative, neither could have been
aware of the incurable physical incapacity which existed at the time of con-
tracting the marriage. 71 One might reasonably surmise, therefore, thatethe
physical problem must have been of a subtle and latent character. 72 The
subsequent failure of the marriage resulted from events beyond the control
of the parties, rendering the marriage apparently impracticable. Such facts
are fully consistent with the no fault concepts exemplified by the new Act's
provisions for dissolution. An interlocutory period would afford the parties
an opportunity for reflection upon the gravity of sacrificing an otherwise
satisfactory marriage through nullity proceedings. The parties might retain
profound affection for each other, seeking annulment improvidently as a
purely emotional reaction to disclosure of the incurable physical condition.
Typically, however, one or both parties would be aware of the condition
from the beginning. Since the subsection (f) nullity remedy of section 4425
is available only to the "party injured", 73 arguably a person with knowl-
09 "A court may decree a dissolution of the marriage . . . ." Id. § 4506. It is
doubtful whether the court could deny a petition where the facts properly admitted
in evidence supported the truth of the allegation of irreconcilable differences or incur-
able insanity. See Lewis v. Lewis, 167 Cal. 732, 141 P. 367 (1914); Quagelli v.
Quagelli, 99 Cal. App. 172, 277 P. 1089 (1929); Dee v. Dee, 87 Cal. App. 17, 261 P.
501 (1927). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R. 271 (1931). But cf. Lewis v. Lewis, supra
at 733, 141 P. at 368 (the court is given broad discretion to ascertain the facts upon
which the statutory ground for dissolution is asserted).
70 CAL. Cxv. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1970-71).
71 Id. § 4452. See 1 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 83.
72 This is notwithstanding the observation of the courts that "[tihe physical in-
capacity here referred to, as is thoroughly established, is the physical incapacity to con-
summate the marriage by coition." Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 802, 167 P. 394,
396 (1917).
73 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4426(f) (West 1970).
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edge of the impediment (and actual or constructive knowledge of its ap-
parent incurability) would not qualify.74 Where both parties were aware of
the situation, the action would not be available. They would then, no
doubt, seek relief through dissolution. This is appropriate since they must
not have considered the incapacity a substantial reason for not entering into
the marriage. If the unsound party was aware of the condition prior to mar-
riage, failing to disclose it to the other, a classic case supporting avoidance
on the basis of fraud would exist and section 4425(d) would provide an
adequate remedy.75
Does it follow that subsection (f) should be eliminated in favor of the dis-
solution remedy? It is submitted that it should not. In typical cases under
subsection (f), the action will be brought by reason of incurable sexual im-
potence.7 6 Declaration of nullity would operate to show that, by reason of
apparently incurable sexual impotence prevailing from the time of contract-
ing the purported marriage, no valid marriage ever existed in a physical
sense. Such a showing might well enhance the desirability of the putative
spouse to prospective future spouses. So long as society considers virginity
to be of legal or social significance, the parties should have the benefit of
the more specific ground for declaration of nullity which physical incapacity
affords.
The preceding discussion indicates that the legislature properly determined
that the respective grounds for declaration of nullity for voidable marriage
could not be subsumed within dissolution. Additional considerations demon-
strate that the present action for dissolution would be inappropriate as a
remedy under the facts contemplated by section 4425.
74 See 1 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 83.
75 Recall that mere fraud in the inducement is insufficient to support an action for
annullment. The fraud must vitiate the essence of the marital relation. Fraudulent non-
disclosure of sexual impotence is a classic example. Millar v. Millar 175 Cal. 797, 803,
167 P. 394, 396 (1917).
76 Indeed, it has been suggested that the action will be available only where physical
incapacity to consumate the marriage by coition is involved. Id. at 802, 167 P. at 396.
There would appear to be no contemporary reason why sterility should not afford a
basis for declaration of nullity under subsection (f). The courts and authorities do
not support this contention, however. Id. Stepanek v. Stepanek, 193 Cal. App. 2d 760,
762, 14 Cal. Rptr. 793, 794 (1961); W. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS
AN DoMSTc RELATIONS § 16 (3d ed. R. Cooley 1921); 1 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAws § 42 (1931).
It is submitted that it is now time for judicial reappraisal of the prevailing anachronis-
tic dictum that incurable physical incapacity does not include infertility. Cases have
already recognized that deprivation of progeny goes to the essence of the marital rela-
tion. See Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859); Vileta v. Vileta, 53 Cal. App. 2d 794,
796, 128 P.2d 376, 377 (1942); Aufort v. Aufort, 9 Cal. App. 2d 310, 311, 49 P.2d 620,
621 (1935).
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STANDING TO BRING THE ACTION
Title 377 providing for dissolution of marriage does not specifically recog-
nize standing on the part of anyone foreign to the marriage. Prior case law
uniformly suggests that such standing will inhere to the parties alone. 78 The
conspicuous absence of provisions to the contrary in the Act suggests an in-
tention not to derrogate from the decisional law in this respect.
In contrast, standing is accorded designated third parties under certain of
the causes of action for declaration of nullity: 79
4425 Annulment Ground 4426 Third Party
(a) § 4101 incapacity - -parent, guardian, person
having charge of minor
prior to majority
(b) Enoch Arden . ormer spouse
(c) Unsound mind relative or guardian
(d) Fraud none
(e) Force none
(f) Physical incapacity -none
The incapacity and unsound mind provisions are clearly designed to protect
the interests of persons who might be incapable of exercising sound judg-
ment. Without recognizing standing on the part of concerned third parties,
such immature or mentally defective persons would be vulnerable to the
importunity of their spouses and their own improvidence. They would be
incapable of perceiving the desirability of either dissolution or declaration of
nullity. The legislature was careful to relegate the grave responsibility of
bringing the action in their behalf only to those persons who, through blood
or fiduciary duty, would seek declaration of nullity exclusively in the in-
terest of the incompetent. But the dangers of exposing an otherwise viable
relationship to the caprice or selfishness of third parties is patent. The ab-
sence of complete discretion to deny a petition for declaration of nullity
compounds the danger. In delineating the scope of judicial discretion to
deny an action for declaration of nullity brought by a minor through his
mother, guardian ad litem, a California appellate court recently suggested that
the use of the word "may" in Civil Code section 82 (now section 4425),
providing that a "marriage may be annulled" for specific grounds, including
non-age, does not render the annulment wholly discretionary with the
trial court in view of the affirmative policy of the state to restrict marriages
of minors.80
The court cited with approval the view that the defense of unclean hands
was inappropriate to domestic relations cases.81  Notwithstanding the
77 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4500-31 (West 1970).
78 See Cohen v. Cohen, 73 Cal. App. 2d 330, 166 P.2d 622 (1946).
79 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4425, 4426 (West 1970).
80 Ruiz v. Ruiz, 6 Cal. App. 3d 58, 85 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1970).
81 Id. at 60, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
[Vol. 4
COMMENTS
misrepresentation of the son that he was of age to marry (he was in fact
17 at the time of contracting the purported marriage), the court observed:
"we conclude that the clear public policy cannot be frustrated by the con-
duct of the minor, however reprehensible." 82 The court was correct in ob-
serving that the legislative purpose of subsection (a) respecting non-age
marriage could be frustrated if the immature minor, in whose behalf the
statute was enacted, could through his own fraud unilaterally accomplish a
marriage free from attack by his guardian. But expansive wording in ap-
plying a public policy rationale has clouded the availability of traditional
equitable defenses under any of the grounds for annulment. In the court's
words: "[I]t seems clear that the code declares an affirmative policy of the
state to restrict marriages of minors .... ,,83 Denial of the equitable de-
fenses of unclean hands, laches, or estoppel would seem particularly uncon-
scionable where the Enoch Arden situation contemplated by subsection (b)
exists. Furthermore, since the court was denied discretion, it could not
avoid an unjust result. It is submitted that the propriety of recognizing
standing in parties foreign to the purported marriage may turn on the avail-
ability of judicial discretion and equitable defenses.
The recognition of standing in a former spouse to vitiate an Enoch Arden
marriage8 4 is vulnerable to further criticism. Significantly, the Governor's
Commission in its proposed Family Court Act 5 intentionally provided
otherwise. As was noted concerning the Commission's proposal:
[T]he proposed . . . Act does not give such standing to former spouses, where
the marriage is unknowingly bigamous. . . . Thus, the putative spouse and the
bigamous spouse could remain married despite the will of the former spouse to the
contrary.
86
Although it has been suggested that section 4425 (b) recognizing the Enoch
Arden ground for declaration of nullity should be maintained in its present
form,8 7 it does not follow that recognition of standing in a prior spouse is
sound. The evil of such provision is apparent when viewed in the context.
of the following hypothetical situation: H1 and W were married three months,
living as husband and wife. H1 disappeared without explanation. In fact,
H1 was "born under a wandering star." An exhaustive search, initiated by
W through the appropriate governmental agencies, failed to disclose any in-
formation concerning his disappearance. After five years, W concluded that
H must have died. Subsequently, she fell in love with H2 and they were
married. Ten years later, after three children were born to W and H2, H
returned. Is it reasonable that H1 should be allowed to vitiate the marriage
82 Id.
88 Id.
84 CAL. Cv. CoDE § 4426(b) (West 1970).
85 The Family Court Act, submitted to the California legislature as A.B. 230 &
S.B. 88, Reg. Sess. (1968).
86 Hammer, supra note 7, at 67.
87 See discussion pages 339-40 supra.
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of W and H2 and expose their three children to the attendant emotional
trauma? If he were successful W would have no recourse but to institute
dissolution proceedings against H1 and go through the formality of an inter-
locutory period before resumption of the second fulfulling marriage.88 If
she did desire a dissolution of her first marriage, her interest and that of
H1 would be adequately served without recognizing standing in H1. She
could bring an action for declaration of nullity as to the second marriage and
be immediately reunited with H1. Society's interest would be protected since
H1 could not for vindictive or selfish reasons intrude into the lives of the
second family. The intermediate proceeding for annulment would not re-
duce to a fiction. The potential for injustice is increased in the light of the
broad language of Ruiz. The courts might well rationalize a legislative pro-
nouncement of policy against bigamous marriage, whether willful or inno-
cent, with the result that such marriages should be voidable. Accordingly,
the court would be without discretion to deny declaration of nullity pursuant
to the petition of the first spouse. Furthermore, the availability of equitable
defenses through which the court could avoid hardship would be question-
able. It would seem, therefore, that the Commission was correct in recom-
mending against recognition of standing in the former spouse to bring an
action for declaration of nullity.
LIMITATIONS ON DECLARATION OF NuLLITY
The statutes of limitation and substantive limitations applied to declara-
tion of nullity differ from those applicable to dissolution. It appears that
the only limitation upon bringing an action for dissolution would be the death
of one of the parties to the marriage.89 Death of one of the parties after
entry of the interlocutory, however, would not preclude the issuance of fi-
nal judgment of dissolution.90 Laches would also appear inappropriate
since the proceeding for dissolution is predicated upon continuing irrecon-
cilable differences, the focus being upon conditions at the time of the ac-
tion.
91
Where actions for declaration of nullity are brought pursuant to the Enoch
Arden or unsound mind grounds the statute similarly provides that an action
cannot be maintained after the death of either party to the purported void-
able marriage.9 2 Actions for declaration of nullity on any other grounds
are not expressly limited upon death of either party. 93 As a matter of stat-
88 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4512-14 (West 1970).
89 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4350 (West Supp. 1970-71); Kellett v. Marvel, 9 Cal. App.
2d 629, 51 P.2d 185 (1935).
90 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4514 (West 1970).
91 Laches was formerly recognized as a defense to divorce pursuant to fault grounds.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 124 (repealed by ch. 1608, § 3, [19691 Cal. Stat.).
92 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4426(b),(c) (West 1970).
93 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4426 (West 1970).
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utory construction, one might argue a legislative intention that the action sur-
vive except as otherwise provided.94 Two arguments to the contrary may
be made. Though the Act limits an action for annulment on the grounds
of Enoch Arden to the lives of either party to the voidable marriage, it
does not purport to limit the action upon the life of the former absent spouse.
However, where a wife attempted to secure an annulment of her second mar-
riage in order to participate in the estate of her former spouse, a California
appellate court observed in Estate of LeMont:95 "[T]he claimant's status
must be determined as of the date of death." 96  The court extended the
death limitation beyond the parties to the second marriage. In LeMont, the
wife had remarried six years after separation, believing her first husband
dead. She discovered after his death that he had been alive at the time of
her second marriage. However, strict compliance with the letter of the Act
was deemed by the court to be insufficient to bring the action within the
provisions for declaration of nullity.97 The implications of LeMont were
clear: death may operate as a limitation upon actions for declaration of
nullity, even without an express statutory mandate. Case law construing
analogous annulment grounds suggests similar limitations.98 It would ap-
pear, therefore, that no significant difference may exist between annulment
and dissolution with respect to death as a limitation.
Differences, however, exist in other respects. Theoretically, at least, dec-
laration of nullity is appropriate only where the grounds supporting it ex-
isted at the time of contracting the purported marriage.99 Dissolution, how-
ever, looks to conditions existing at the time of the action. Arguably, par-
ties to voidable marriage might seek declaration of nullity because of the con-
tinuing debilitory effect of the initial impediment. If they could not sustain
their burden of proof respecting the initial impediment, it is obvious that dis-
solution would be available as an alternative, so long as irreconcilable dif-
94 The conspicuous omission of an express limitation upon the death of a party
would suggest a legislative intent that the action for declaration of nullity on those
grounds should survive through application of the rule expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. See Jones v. Robertson, 79 Cal. App. 2d 813, 180 P.2d 929 (1947) (the ex-
press mention of a thing implies the exclusion of another different thing).
95 7 Cal. App. 3d 437, 86 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1970).
90 Id. at 439, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 811, citing Estate of Harrington, 140 Cal. 244, 73 P.
1000 (1903).
97 "Only if Maurine [petitioner] had secured her annulment while decedent was still
alive, could she contend that her marriage to him-suspended in legal effect during her
later marriage-had become revived so as to give her a widow's status .... Since we
do not countenance a woman having two husbands concurrently, it follows that she can-
not, at the moment of death, be both widow and wife." Id. at 440, 86 Cal. Rptr. at
811-12.
98 See 1 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 83 (1953); Annot., Right to Attack Va-
lidity of Marriage After Death of Party Thereto, 47 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1956); Annot., 76
A.L.R. 769 (1932).
90 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4425 (West 1970).
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ferences existed. As to third parties properly seeking relief under these nul-
lity remedies, however, the requirement that an initial defect be proved seems
more functional. 100 Such parties should bring the action, not on the basis
of de facto irreconcilable differences between the parties to the voidable
marriage, from which they are removed, but rather on the basis of facts ex-
isting at the time of marriage. They could prevail only if the initial impedi-
ment was alleged and proved to the court's satisfaction. Accordingly, this
distinction would operate as a limitation upon their capacity to interfere in
the lives of other people. This is not to say that third parties would be in-
different to the continuing effect of the original impediment. They would be
inclined to initiate the action because the voidable marriage in essence was
not in the interests of their charge. One might suggest that the impropriety
of allowing a former spouse to bring an action in the Enoch Arden situation
is demonstrated by the lack of consideration such a person might give to pre-
vailing circumstances.
The Act provides other limitations in declaration of nullity actions, typ-
ically time and free cohabitation as husband and wife.' 0 ' These limita-
tions would certainly operate as a deterrent to improper use of nullity pro-
ceedings as a mere substitute for dissolution. By removing fault from most
dissolution proceedings and providing for equal division of community prop-
erty, the likelihood of such abuse is increased. The petitioner might choose
declaration of nullity in order to plead a specific fault ground. Moreover,
a putative spouse might bring the action for declaration of nullity rather
than dissolution in order to derive enhanced participation in the property ac-
quired during the period of the voidable marriage.' 02 Accordingly, the lim-
itations serve to assist the legislative purpose of the Act, which is to termi-
nate the marriage on a basis consistent with the realities of human behavior
and subjective state of mind of the parties.
PROPERTY CONSEQUENCES
One of the hallmarks of the Act is that it has removed much of the prop-
100 As to permissible third parties, see discussion page 346 supra.
101 See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4425-26 (West 1970):
GROUNDS LIMTAIONS
a. § 4101 incapacity Free cohabitation as H and W after
reaching the age of consent. Within
four years of reaching age of consent
as to H and W. At any time before
reaching the age of consent as to par-
ents.
b. unsound mind Free cohabitation after coming to reason
as to the party of unsound mind.
c. fraud Free cohabitation after discovery of the
facts constituting the fraud or within
four years of discovery of such facts.
d. force Free cohabitation as H and W. Within
four years of marriage.
e. physical incapacity Four years after marriage.
102 See page 352 infra.
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erty incentive to the introduction of fault in dissolution proceedings. 108
The court, subject to certain exceptions, 104 no longer has discretion to
award more than one-half of the community property to either party to the
marriage. Similarly, fault has been removed from the award of spousal sup-
port.10 5 Under the Act, the court may consider the relative circumstances
of the parties, duration of the marriage, and the ability of either to secure
gainful employment. 106 Accordingly, need would appear to be the proper
criterion. Unless the courts construe "relative circumstances" to include
prior acts of misconduct, it would appear that this standard will be consis-
tent with the no-fault premise of dissolution. The length of time for which
spousal support will be payable will continue to be a matter for judicial dis-
cretion.10 7 The court is also expressly granted discretion to modify or
revoke an order for support where the dependent spouse is living and holding
himself out as the husband or wife of another.'08 Furthermore, without a
contrary agreement between the parties in writing, the obligation of spousal
support would terminate upon death of either party or remarriage of the
dependent party.10 9 Where the court has provided in its order for a specific
term for which spousal support is payable, it is clear that the court could
not extend its term unless the initial order had reserved jurisdiction to do
so. 1
0
It is apparent that different property consequences could attend an action
for declaration of nullity. Sections 4800 (providing for division of com-
munity property) and 4801(a) (relating to award of spousal support)
expressly apply only to dissolution."' No mention is made of declaration
of nullity. Property division upon declaration of nullity is accomplished in
accordance with section 4452, which provides in part:
Whenever a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the
court finds that either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage
was valid, the court shall declare such party or parties to have the status of a puta-
tive spouse, and ... shall divide in accordance with Section 4800, that property ac-
quired during the union which would have been community property or quasi-
community property if the union had not been void or voidable. Such property
103 CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 4800-13 (West 1970 &West Supp. 1970-71).
104 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(b)-(c), 4358 (West Supp. 1970-71). See note 18
supra.
'o5 CAL. Civ. CODE H9 4357, 4801 (West Supp. 1970-71). Costs and attorney's
fees will also be awarded irrespective of fault; the guiding consideration being the reason-
able and necessary cost of maintaining the action. Id. H9 4370-71.
106 Id. § 4801(a).
107 Id. § 4801(a),(d),(e).
108 Id. § 4801(c).
109 Id. § 4801(b).
110 Long v. Long, 17 Cal. 2d 409, 410, 110 P.2d 383, 384 (1941). See generally
1 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note 60, at 371-88 (modification of alimony by court order and
by operation of law).
Ill CAL. Civ. CODE H9 4800, 4801(a) (West Supp. 1970-71).
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shall be termed "quasi-marital property"....112
Since the equal division provisions applicable to dissolution are incor-
porated into the nullity statute, a first reading would suggest that where a
putative spouse is a party the property consequences are identical to those
upon dissolution.
In reality a significant difference may exist. Under the dissolution pro-
visions of section 4800, a culpable spouse could secure participation in the
community property equal to that of the non-culpable spouse.113 This is,
of course, consistent with the no-fault premise of the Act. However, under
the nullity provisions the putative spouse might well enjoy twice the parti-
cipation available under dissolution.
Suppose that most of the property accumulated during the period of the
voidable marriage was the product of the putative spouse's effort. But for
the purported marriage such property would clearly be the separate prop-
erty of the party earning it. Notwithstanding the ambiguous wording of
section 4452 noted above, it is submitted that it was the legislative inten-
tion to provide a statutory remedy to a putative party to a void or voidable
marriage, not to create in a non-putative petitioner a property right unavail-
able but for his misconduct. This would be consistent with the remedy
recognized at equity prior to the Act.114 Moreover, any other construction
would make the state a party to the unjust enrichment of the culpable non-
putative spouse and encourage importunity and fraud. Hence, where a
putative spouse brought the action for declaration of nullity, it is clear that
quasi-marital property would be recognized to protect his good faith effort
at matrimony. However, where a non-putive spouse brought the action un-
der the circumstances above, no quasi-marital property would be recognized
as to him. Presumably, quasi-marital property would be available un-
der these circumstances to the putative respondent. Where the putative
spouse had contributed most of the property to the purported marriage it
would not appear to be in his interest to pray for quasi-marital property.
Quasi-marital property would not appear to be a vested property interest but
rather a statutory remedy available to a putative spouse. This result is sug-
gested by a recent amendment to the Act which provides that such property
will be declared by the court only where the "division of property is in is-
sue."11 5 Arguably, by not placing quasi-marital property at issue the puta-
tive spouse could retain what would be denominated separate property.
Where the non-putative party placed division of property at issue, it is sub-
mitted that courts will so construe section 4452 as to preclude unjust en-
richment.
112 Id. § 4452 (emphasis added).
113 But see note 18 supra.
114 See Flanagan v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d 307 (1931); Miller v.
Johnson, 214 Cal. App. 2d 123, 29 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1963).
115 CAL. Crv. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1970-71).
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Obviously, the putative spouse would realize a considerable benefit by
bringing an action for declaration of nullity rather than dissolution. Is such
a result desirable? It would appear so. This situation could arise only
where one of the spouses was non-putative116 and the other putative. Un-
der such circumstances, the non-putative spouse would be considered on no-
tice of the defective character of the marriage and should not profit by rea-
son of his own culpability to the prejudice of the innocent putative spouse.
Otherwise, such odious conduct as fraud or force might become profitable
ploys for the unscrupulous; the no-fault dissolution remedy could be per-
verted to facilitate importunity and fraud.
Differences between declaration of nullity and dissolution also exist rela-
tive to property settlement agreements. The Act impliedly recognizes the
validity of such agreements, at least as to dissolution. 11 7 It stipulates
that so much of such agreement as provides for spousal support and child
support shall be severable."18 The section also provides that so much of the
agreement as applies to child support shall be modifiable or revocable by
the court at any time, notwithstanding inconsistent provisions between the
parties.1 9 Further, that portion relating to spousal support is modifiable
or revocable by the court subject only to express provision between the par-
ties to the contrary. 120 Hence, the stringency of prior law, which had
rendered "integrated property settlement agreements" non-modifiable, is
relaxed.
1 2 1
116 Le., did not believe in good faith that the purported marriage was valid. Id.
It is unclear whether under the Act this disbelief would need to be causally related to
the ground asserted for declaration of nullity.
1"7 Id. § 4811. See Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 177 P.2d 265 (1947).
118 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4811(a),(b) (West Supp. 1970-71).
119 Id. § 4811(a).
120 Id. § 4811(b).
121 "An agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt the writing or
writings as the final and complete expression of the agreement. . . ." RESTATEMENT
OF CoNTRACTs § 228 (1932). See also Wilson v. Viking Corp., 134 Pa. Super.
153, 3 A.2d 180 (1938); Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Cal. 2d 36, 265 P.2d 873 (1954) (it is
settled that integrated settlement agreements are not modifiable). Case law prior to
the Act suggested that, as a matter of law, such an agreement was non-modifiable and
monthly monetary payments thereunder were not severable, subject to express provi-
sions in the agreement otherwise. Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Cal. 2d 619, 628, 297
P.2d 988, 993 (1956):
When . . . the parties have clearly expressed their "purpose of fixing and adjust-
ing their personal and property rights," have provided that the provision for ali-
mony is "for and in consideration of the permanent . . . settlement of all their
property rights of every kind ... " and the wife has waived "all right to future
.. . support . . . , except as herein otherwise expressly provided," the conclu-
sion is inescapable that they have made the provisions for support . . . an insepar-
able part of their . . . agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration,
the provisions for support. . . would be subject to modification only if the parties
expressly so provided.
Accord, Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal. 2d 49, 265 P.2d 881 (1954). See 1 B. ARMSTRONG, supra
note 60, at 803.
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Some doubt prevails concerning the application of these principles to nul-
lity. The provisions relating to property settlement agreements are to be
found under Title 6 of the Act, "Property Rights of the Parties",'
122 Cer-
tain of the sections included within Title 6 expressly apply only to actions
for dissolution or legal separation, not nullity.123 Other sections apply to
the provisions of "this part", which would include nullity as well as dissolu-
tion.124  Unfortunately, the aforementioned settlement agreement provi-
sions are silent as to the proceedings to which they relate. 2  Accord-
ingly, the modifiability or revocability of an agreement providing for spou-
sal support pursuant to an action for declaration of nullity is questionable.
It might be argued that the settlement agreement provisions of Title
6 apply to nullity proceedings as well as to dissolution. One might suggest
that if the legislature had intended the provisions of Title 6 to apply only to
dissolution and legal separation except as otherwise provided, they could
have expressly so stated. Alternatively, they could have included the set-
tlement agreement provisions under discussion within Title 3, entitled "Dis-
solution of Marriage", rather than separately. Separate treatment would
suggest, as a general rule, that the provisions of Title 6 should apply to all
proceedings under the Act, subject to express provision to the contrary.
A different inference of legislative intention would inevitably lead to the
conclusion that the express limitation of particular sections to dissolution
and legal separation was superfluous, an inference incompatible with the
sophistication of the draftsmen. 126  Accordingly, the court would have
power to modify an agreement for spousal support, even in nullity situations,
subject only to the limitations imposed by the Act upon similar action in
dissolution proceedings.
Disturbingly, however, spousal support pursuant to nullity proceedings
receives express treatment elsewhere in the Act. Section 4455 provides:
The court may, during the pendency of a proceeding to have a marriage adjudged
a nullity or upon judgment, order a party to pay for the support of the other party in
the same manner as if the marriage had not been void or voidable, provided that the
party for whose benefit the order is made is found to be a putative spouse.12
7
This section is patently distinguishable from the Title 6 settlement agreement
provisions: (a) there is no express provision respecting modifiability or
revocability; and (b) it applies to court orders rather than agreements be-
tween the parties. Clearly where the right to spousal support was solely
122 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4800-13 (West 1970 & West Supp. 1970-71).
123 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800-01 (West 1970).
124 Id. §§ 4803, 4805. "This part" refers to Part 5 of the California Civil Code,
which includes the Family Law Act.
125 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4811 (West Supp. 1970-71).
126 The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius would suggest a similar result.
See note 94 supra.
127 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1970-71) (emphasis added).
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the product of court order, the court could expressly reserve jurisdic-
tion to modify or revoke it.'28  Additionally, section 4801, pertain-
ing to orders for spousal support in dissolution, is the counterpart to
section 4455. Where the recipient party is putative, the language quoted
from section 4455 suggests that the other party will be ordered to pay spousal
support "in the same manner as if the marriage had not been void or void-
able.1' 2 9  This would be a clear reference to section 4801. Significantly,
spousal support pursuant to that section is expressly modifiable or revok-
able by the court.' 30 It would appear, then, that where an award of spou-
sal support was allowable upon declaration of nullity (where the party for
whose benefit it was paid was putative), modification or revocation of the
order could be accomplished. Furthermore, since section 4455 applies only
to court orders rather than settlement agreements per se, a separate statu-
tory treatment would not derrogate from the applicability of Title 6 settle-
ment agreement provisions to nullity proceedings. Where spousal support was
the product of an agreement between the parties other than a property set-
tlement agreement, the availability of the Title 6 provisions in nullity pro-
ceedings would facilitate modification by the court. In the statutory lan-
guage: "The provisions of any agreement or order for the support of either
party shall be subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court or-
der. .. .
EFFECT OF THE JUDGMENT
One of the historic and fundamental distinctions between annulment and
divorce has been the effect of the judgment upon parties foreign to the ac-
tion.132 The Act purports to preserve this distinction: "A judgment of nul-
lity is conclusive only as to the parties to the proceeding and those claiming
under them."'1 33 No similar provision is included in the Act respecting dis-
solution. The logical inference would be that final judgment of dissolution,
acting in rem or quasi-in-rem, would be res judicata or create an estoppel by
judgment as to third parties, at least as to particular facts and issues liti-
128 Cf. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4809 (West 1970).
129 CAL. CIv. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1970-71).
130 "Any order for support... may be modified or revoked as the court may deem
necessary. . . ." Id. § 4801.
131 Id. § 4811(b) (emphasis added). Where an agreement to provide support
arises in a nullity proceeding outside the context of a property settlement agreement,
the parties could certainly assure modifiability or revocability by so providing in the
agreement. Alternatively, they could have the agreement merged in the judgment de-
claring nullity. The court could then reserve jurisdiction to modify it's decree, and
modification or revocation could be accomplished by the court pursuant to a proper or-
der. Lubin v. Lubin, 144 Cal. App. 2d 781, 302 P.2d 49 (1956).
132 See 4 J. GODDARD, supra note 33, at § 561 (1965); 1 B. ARMSTRONG, supra note
60, at 93-96 (1953); Price v. Price, 24 Cal. App. 2d 462, 467, 75 P.2d 655, 658 (1938).
133 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4451 (West 1970).
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gated.'L4 The development of case law in California, however, obfuscates
this distinction.
In Watkins v. Watkins 35 a California appellate court stated that after an
action for divorce had been successfully maintained a second suit could not
be brought to try again anything within the scope of the first action.' Ac-
cordingly, a determination of title to real property accomplished in the prior
divorce action was deemed res judicata as to a subsequent quiet title action
respecting the same property. Watkins, however, involved the parties to the
original action. The court would appear to have been over-zealous in stating
the general rule. It is safe to say, however, that as between parties to the
action for dissolution and their privies, the judgment is res judicata not only
of their status with relation to each other, but also of all issues that were lit-
igated or that could have been litigated therein.137 However, insofar as the
proceeding related to the validity of the marriage, it would not be binding
upon parties foreign to it.1 3 s Indeed, the judgment would be res judicata
as to strangers only as a conclusive determination that the parties were
thereafter free to remarry so far as any relation to each other was con-
cerned.'3 9 Does this afford a basis of distinction between dissolution and
134 It is a well-established rule of law that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and of their privies, and
as to them constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim,
demand, or further action. It is also a well-established principle of law that a final
judgment precludes the relitigation of particular facts or issues litigated in a previous
action, where the later action is between the same parties or their privies although the
causes of action are different. The rule first referred to is denominated as the doctrine
of res judicata, and the rule last referred to is known as the doctrine of estoppel by judg-
ment.
These doctrines as to the conclusiveness of judgments, either to preclude the institu-
tion of another action upon the same cause of action or to preclude the relitigation of
issues and facts once litigated, operate only as between the parties to the litigation or
their privies, where the judgment is one in personam. They do not operate to affect
strangers to the judgment, that is, persons who are neither parties to the former litiga-
tion nor privies of those who were parties.
A judgment in rem, however, is res judicata and conclusive as to the whole world-
parties and nonparties or strangers alike. But this principle applies to bind strangers
to the judgment only as to the ultimate matter, condition, relation, or status particularly
adjudicated in the previous action. Even facts upon which the judgment in rem is
necessarily predicated and which must therefore be deemed as expressly or by implica-
tion adjudicated are not res judicata as to persons not actually participating or contest-
ing the proceedings, though interested therein, when the same issues arise with respect
to a different subject matter. Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1164-65 (1951) (citations omitted).
'35 117 Cal. App. 2d 610, 256 P.2d 339 (1953).
136 Id. at 611, 256 P.2d at 340, citing Bennet v. Forest, 24 Cal. 2d 485, 150 P.2d
416 (1944).
137 Id.
138 Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950). See 4 J. GODDAPW,
supra note 33, at 817.
139 Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 796, 801, 221 P.2d 1, 4, (1950) (dictum).
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nullity? There would appear to be no logical reason why a subsequent
spouse should not be able to rely upon the validity of a declaration of nul-
lity to the same extent as dissolution insofar as the right of the parties to re-
marry is concerned. Indeed, such reliance would appear to be justifiable
in light of the language of the Act: "The effect of a judgment of nullity is to
restore the parties to the status of unmarried persons.' 40  This wording is
conspicuously similar to that applicable to dissolution. 41  The California
Supreme Court has observed relative to divorce: "The weight of authority
holds that a decree of divorce is a judgment in rem only to the extent that
it adjudicates the future status of the parties in relation to each other.'
42
The court went on to state the rule that ". . . between strangers or strangers
and parties . . . the decree is res judicata only in that it conclusively de-
termines that the parties are thereafter free to remarry so far as any relation
to each other is concerned.' 43 In support of this rule the court cited Es-
tate of James:
144
The decree of divorce. . . established the status of the deceased as an unmarried
man, leaving him free to again enter into the marriage relation with any other per-
son consenting thereto. . . After that decree, and until reversed or vacated by
some appropriate proceeding, his status as a single man could not be changed with-
out his consent. 145
Hence, it would appear that the right of parties to dissolution to remarry is
unassailable because of the operative effect of the judgment in restoring
them to the status of unmarried persons. By analogy, the same reasoning
should apply to nullity. The spector of blind adherence to the purported
general rule that declaration of nullity is not conclusive as to strangers to the
action looms large, however. Such a distinction between nullity and dis-
solution would appear to be highly artificial, insofar as the future status of
the parties is concerned. If the world is entitled to rely upon a judgment
of dissolution insofar as it determines the right of parties to remarry, similar
reliance should be justified after declaration of nullity. If the trier of fact
has adjudicated the right of the parties to a declaration of nullity on the basis
of facts proved, it would appear consistent with public policy to afford them
the right to remarry and create a stable environment for subsequent child-
ren. If extrinsic fraud has been perpetrated upon the court in the nullity
proceeding, public interest and the interest of affected parties would be pro-
tected through an action to vacate the judgment for all purposes.
146
Where third parties were prejudiced by operation of the declaration of nul-
lity, but not through the right of the parties to remarry, their cause of action
would be preserved under either declaration of nullity or dissolution.
140 CAL. Crv. CODE § 4429 (West 1970).
'4' Id. § 4501.
142 Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 796, 801, 221 P.2d 1, 4 (1950).
143 Id.
144 99 Cal. 374, 33 P. 1122 (1893).
145 Id. at 380, 33 P. at 1124-25.
146 Cf. McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222, 237 P. 42 (1925).
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However, the legislative pronouncement that an action for declaration of
nullity would be conclusive only as to the parties and those taking under them
retains significance. This provision was designed to mitigate the hardship
which might attend strict observation of the fiction of relation back upon
declaration of nullity.147 The action for annulment proceeds upon the
theory that, for some cause existing at the time of the purported marriage,
no valid marriage took place. Were this theory carried to its logical ex-
treme, an unconscionable result might follow. Therefore, the courts will not
invoke the doctrine where an unfavored result is accomplished and unfairness
to third persons results.148 Apparently, where the doctrine would injure in-
nocent third parties, it will not be invoked and no distinction on this basis
will exist between nullity and dissolution.
This is not to say that the doctrine retains no practical and legal signifi-
cance. Indeed, the "doctrine of 'relation back' . . . was fashioned by [the]
courts to do substantial justice as between the parties to a voidable mar-
riage."'149 Consistent with this premise, the courts have indulged the doc-
trine to: restore to a policeman's widow pension rights which had abated
upon entry into a voidable second marriage;150 reinstate a widow's insur-
ance benefits under the Social Security Act after annulment of her re-
marriage; 151 declare a promissory note signed by a minor putative wife
during a voidable marriage void as to her where guardianship proceedings
had been instituted thirteen years prior to her purported marriage. 152 Ac-
cordingly, the doctrine is not moribund but serves a legitimate purpose in
avoiding hardship. It is clear that dissolution could not accomplish this re-
sult since it would operate only prospectively and not relate back to relieve
injustice.153
147 Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 876, 291 P.2d 439, 441 (1955). See Price v.
Price, 24 Cal. App. 2d 462, 75 P.2d 655 (1938).
148 Where third parties might be prejudiced were the doctrine of relation back ap-
plied, the courts have refused to do so. Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439
(1955) (voidable second marriage deemed a remarriage such as would terminate the
former husband's obligation for support under a property settlement agreement, the court
reasoning that the former husband had detrimentally relied upon the attempt at re-
marriage); Estate of Gosnell, 63 Cal. App. 2d 38, 146 P.2d 42 (1944) (voidable re-
marriage of a widow terminated her special rights in her former, now deceased, hus-
band's estate). Certain statutory provisions are also inconsistent with the doctrine:
CAr.. Civ. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1970-71) (quasi-marital property accumulated dur-
ing putative marriage); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4453 (West 1970) (children born of the
void or voidable marriage legitimate); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4350, 4425 (West Supp. 1970-
71) (voidable marriage legally effective until adjudged a nullity).
'49 Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 875, 291 P.2d 439, 441 (1955).
150 Clark v. Los Angeles, 187 Cal. App. 2d 792, 9 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1960); Cottam
v. Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 523, 7 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1960).
151 Folsam v. Pearsall, 245 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1957).
152 Niemann v. Deverich, 98 Cal. App. 2d 787, 221 P.2d 178 (1950).
158 Cf. Shaw v. Board of Admin., 109 Cal. App. 2d 770, 241 P.2d 635 (1952).
[Vol. 4
COMMENTS
Therefore, the legislature was correct in retaining declaration of nullity be-
cause of the operative effect of the doctrine of relation back.154 Since
the courts apply it in accordance with equitable principles, the likelihood of
harm is reduced, it will be resorted to only to accomplish justice which
would be unavailable under dissolution.
RESIDENCE AND JURISDICTION
The Act retains residence requirements, in the legal sense of domicile, 15a
as a prerequisite to entry of judgment decreeing dissolution. It provides:
A judgment decreeing the dissolution of a marriage may not be entered unless one
of the parties to the marriage has been a resident of this state for six months and of
the county in which the proceeding is filed for three months next preceding the fil-
ing of the petition. 156
The Act further provides that, for the purpose of establishing the requisite
domicile or residence, ". . . neither the domicile nor residence of the hus-
band shall be deemed to be the domicile or residence of the wife."'
57
Therefore, as to dissolution, the presence of domicile in the forum state may
be deemed jurisdictional.' 5 8  Should a final judgment for dissolution
issue pursuant to a sham domicile, the judgment might be subsequently vul-
nerable to collateral attack.' 59
As to declaration of nullity, however, domicile is not necessary to support
the court's jurisdiction. Indeed, the California Supreme Court in the case
of Whealton v. Whealton 6 0 concluded that a voidable marriage could be
adjudged a nullity where both parties were before the court even though the
marriage ceremony was celebrated in another state, the defendant was domi-
ciled elsewhere, the matrimonial domicile was maintained elsewhere, and the
plaintiff had not alleged domicile in his pleadings.' 61 The court, however,
vacated a default judgment previously entered where only the plaintiff was
before the trial court. 162 In so doing, however, an ex parte annulment was
approved, even on the facts of the Whealton case as noted, so long as the
plaintiff was a domiciliary of the forum state.'16  It would appear, then, that
a significant distinction between declaration of nullity and dissolution with
regard to jurisdiction prevails. It is submitted that this distinction is ap-
propriate, for it affords innocent parties to a voidable marriage an immediate
154 See note 6 supra.
'55 Haas v. Haas, 227 Cal. App. 2d 615, 617, 38 Cal. Rptr. 811, 813 (1964).
156 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4530(a) (West 1970).
'57 Id. § 4531.
158 Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 P. 394 (1917). See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 734
(1953). See also 4 J. GODDARD, supra note 33, at H9 635-41.
159 4 J. GODDARD, supra note 33, at § 639.
160 67 Cal. 2d 656, 432 P.2d 979, 63 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1967).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. citing Buzzi v. Buzzi, 91 Cal. App. 2d 823, 205 P.2d 1125 (1949).
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and convenient forum for relief. Of course, it might also make California
courts a party to forum shopping with the result that the public policy of
sister states could be frustrated. The court in Whealton was careful to ob-
serve, however, that the fact that a court may exercise its jurisdiction does
not require that it do so.164
Term of residence prerequisite to judgment also distinguishes declaration of
nullity from dissolution. Recall that the Act requires domicile in the state
for at least six months and the county in which the action is brought for three
months preceding entry of judgment for dissolution. 1 5 It is settled in
California, however, that length of residence requirements established for dis-
solution do not appertain to annulment.166 The policy rationale generally
propounded for this distinction is that public policy discourages hasty di-
vorces, whereas the perpetuation of an ostensible marriage void ab initio is
a matter of public indifference at best.167 One might also suggest that
it would be unconscionable not to provide an immediate forum for relief to
parties suffering under some of the odious impediments contemplated as
grounds for declaration of nullity, for example, force and fraud. There-
fore, it is obvious that inclusion of declaration of nullity in dissolution would
aggravate hardship by subjecting innocent parties to an arbitrary residence
requirement.
Richard G. Osborn
164 67 Cal. at 664-65, 432 P.2d at 984-85, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 296-97.
165 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 4530 (West 1970).
166 Millar v. Millar, 175 Cal. 797, 167 P. 394 (1917).
167 Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 734, 736 (1953).
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